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Few subjects in corporate law have generated so much controversy as the
hostile takeovers of the last two decades. Not only the substance of the appro-
priate regulation, liberal or restrictive, but also its source, federal or state, have
been debated at length. In the present Essay, a compromise innovative approach
will be outlined to strengthen the role of the securities markets through federal
law with minimal interference in state regulation of corporate internal affairs.
There is little question that, at the state level, the policy issue has been
resolved against "hostile" takeovers. An avalanche of state antitakeover statutes
of different types survived constitutional challenge in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America' and Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp.,2
and are being constantly reinforced by a lenient, pro-management judicial inter-
pretation of the general provisions of state law, especially the "business judg-
ment rule." 3 These developments have enabled management to erect formidable
barritrs against stock concentrations not approved by management (manage-
ment and shareholder consent requirements, diminution of voting rights or im-
position of high voting percentages, denial of resale profits, reduction or elimi-
nation of shareholder rights to call meetings or to act by consent, and, most of
all, poison pills) and to pursue other antitakeover action (lock-ups, sales or
purchases of assets, financing arrangements, golden parachutes, coercive com-
peting tender offers) with virtual impunity. This transfer of the power to decide
who shall own and control the public corporation from the shareholders and the
securities markets to management represents a radical departure from the tradi-
tional corporate ethos, unprecedented in history. Yet, the statutes were enacted
without any substantive debate. The combined clout of corporate management
and labor, and the absence of organized challenge, made the struggle one-sided
and opposition futile. The important, if not principal, issues of whether the price
offered for the stock is substantially higher than market and many shareholders
find it attractive and adequate and, secondarily, of whether competition in a
free securities market is the best way to shift corporate control have been ob-
scured by the smokescreens generated by antitakeover rhetoric. To be sure, the
securities markets may not be perfect and there is room for regulation of the
tender offer to maximize the disclosure of information and to allow time for
* Professor of Law. The Ohio State University.
I. 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (control share acquisition statute).
2. 877 F.2d 496 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989) (anti-merger statute).
3. The ultimate blow against any serious judicial control over management oppositionism has been dealt by
the Delaware Supreme Court in the recent case of Paramount Comm., Inc. v. Time Inc., 1989 WesTILAw 180702
(Del. Supr.). A defensive strategy which had been instituted without the approval and over the opposition of many
shareholders, and which had a devastating effect on stock values, was upheld under the pretense of preserving
"long-term profitability," maintaining corporate "independence," and safeguarding the corporate "culture," as
perceived (or imagined) by management.
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alternatives to develop. But the antitakeover forces swept under the rug the evil
of management's inherent conflict-of-interests and motive for self-perpetuation
and have exacerbated the parochial fears of local communities and employees to
produce a fundamental distortion of what is happening and what is at stake.
The corporate fortifications have become so strong now that only an extraordi-
narily determined, patient, and powerful suitor dare challenge management.
Even then, the battle for control is bound to be expensive, slow, and unpredict-
able, frequently requiring a cumbersome and wasteful proxy fight to unseat the
incumbents.
Congress is now faced with the dilemma of whether to interfere again in
this field, and, if so, in what way. The Williams Act of 1968 sought to protect
the interests of the shareholders in takeovers mostly by regulating the activities
of tender offerors in the direction of fuller disclosure, longer time periods, and
some equal treatment and fairness obligations. While the Act appeared to be
motivated by a policy of neutrality between the tender offeror and management,
its operative language contained virtually no limitations on management power
to obstruct the takeover in any way permissible under state law. This is pre-
cisely what management did in the late 1980s, in the context of a significant
increase in takeover activity spurred by the greater and more orchestrated avail-
ability of private capital through borrowing and foreign investment, and by lax-
ity in antitrust enforcement. While such increase did not affect the overwhelm-
ing favorable ratio of friendly to hostile takeovers (about fifteen-to-one), the
management-labor coalition has recently been able to generate pressures on
Congress to impose additional obligations, mostly on the tender offerors, leaving
the abusive management countermeasures to benign neglect. The various bills
currently being reintroduced in Congress reflect this imbalance in the regula-
tory targets and methods.
It is submitted that, in the reconsideration of its takeover policy,. Congress
should take a more thorough and longer-range view of the interests and stakes
involved in this controversy, steering away from the expediency of patchwork
responses under the political pressures of the moment. If the thrust of such
policy is to remain the same, that is to promote informed choices by individual
shareholders through a free securities market, Congress should also address the
serious threats now posed by management obstructionism. Indeed, now that the
market has penalized the excesses of leveraged takeovers and cooled the fervor
of suitors, it is quite appropriate to shift the focus to those abuses, not amenable
to comparable market discipline, which restrict the rights and freedoms of
shareholders in dealing in their stock without any plausible benefit either to the
shareholders themselves or to the corporation other than the entrenchment of
management paternalism. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
been increasing its efforts to limit management abuses, for example, by requir-
ing documentation of claims that the tender offer price is inadequate and by
changing its interpretation of the proxy rules in favor of shareholder proposals
on golden parachutes. A more serious step has been the adoption of the one-
share-one-vote concept in rule 19c-4. However, the authority of the SEC to so
protect shareholder substantive rights has been challenged in the courts by the
Business Roundtable and, whatever the outcome, it is unlikely that it will pur-
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sue this course with any degree of vigor. Thus, congressional encouragement
and support is needed both to strengthen legitimacy and to chart out the main
avenues of action.
One way of redressing the balance of power between tender offerors and
the management of targets would be to repeal the Williams Act altogether,
leaving the field entirely to private forces. This would have been a viable alter-
native before the state antitakeover juggernaut virtually eliminated the free play
of the market and placed hostile takeovers at an irreducible disadvantage. An-
other method would be for Congress finally to take notice of the reality that
most national corporations are, in all material respects, interstate in ownership,
management, and operations and have no real connection with the chosen state
of incorporation, that state chartering is not only anachronistic and artificial but
also harmful because it encourages a race to the bottom in search for state
revenues rather for than for best rules, and that a federal code for national
corporations, in full or on a minimum-standards basis, should be adopted, bal-
ancing and optimizing the rights and interests of all the corporate constituen-
cies. There is no question that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution pro-
vides ample support for the exercise of such congressional power. As to content,
both the Revised Model Business Corporation Act and the American Law Insti-
tute's recently adopted "Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Rec-
ommendations" provide helpful models. It is worth noting that the European
Economic Community, although less integrated and homogenous than the
United States, recognizes the need for unification of corporate law and is pursu-
ing a program both of harmonizing state corporate law through common guide-
lines and of creating a community-wide single corporate form (societas
europea) for multistate enterprises. It is politically unrealistic, however, to ex-
pect that Congress will follow either one of these diametrically opposed alterna-
tives. There is apparent satisfaction with the Williams Act, so far as it goes, and
the state regulation of corporate affairs, with the choice among organizational
forms that it offers, has produced no disasters.
Assuming that Congress will stay with the current limited jurisdictional
reach of "federal" corporate law, defined by reference to the interstate trading
of securities, two imperatives must be respected. First, the philosophy of take-
over neutrality and of committing transfers of corporate stock and control to
free, informed markets should be reaffirmed and implemented effectively. Sec-
ond, the federal measures should not intrude into the general domain of internal
corporate affairs entrusted to the states.
The innovative approach proposed in this Essay, which centers on the con-
cept of "interstate stock," pursues these two objectives efficiently and with mini-
mal conflict and overlap with the coordinate state authority.
First, it is proposed that the federal law should not preempt state corporate
law at all. The means of pursuing a federal regime of transferability within a
framework of maximum information and adequate time should not be the pre-
emption of non-conforming state law but the exclusion of non-qualifying securi-
ties from the interstate markets.
Second, it is further proposed that federal law should not intrude into cor-
porate structure and management as such. Interfering with management au-
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thority to make business decisions, including those that are intended to oppose a
takeover such as defensive sales or purchases of assets, golden parachutes, fi-
nancing arrangements, counter-tender offers, and the like, would not only be
duplicative of state regulation in an area where state law has the potential of
becoming effective in controlling egregious abuses but would likely prove com-
plicated, expensive, and messy. The transferability issue can and should be ad-
dressed solely through the objective features of the stock itself and the related
corporate constitutive documents which create and define it.
Third, the federal transferability standards can be easily enforced through
the registration process currently in effect in section 12 of the 1934 Act. Only
interstate corporations of some dimension in assets (five million dollars) and of
diversified stock ownership (five hundred shareholders of a class of equity secur-
ities) would come within the purview of the regulation. The objective features of
the securities and of the issuing corporations will determine original registrabil-
ity and continuing eligibility. Such a system would be simple and practical and
would operate prophylactically, thus avoiding initial confusion, reducing subse-
quent litigation, and eliminating potential unexpected liabilities of management.
Furthermore, the objectified approach may and should be drafted so as to pro-
tect transferability not only against management-imposed but also from fellow-
shareholder-approved restraints.
Fourth, the proposed federal system, whose aim would be to protect the
freedom of each shareholder to transfer his stock as he chooses, would disqual-
ify "interstate stock" from being traded in the interstate markets if it is subject
to any of the following restrictions:
a) direct restraints on stock transferability, for example, shareholder or manage-
ment approval requirements, as well as indirect burdens on stock acquisitions or con-
centrations such as diminution of voting rights or other unfavorable differential
treatment;
b) discriminatory treatment at the corporate or shareholder levels of transfers or
concentrations of stock, through such antitakeover devices as poison pills and anti-
merger provisions as well as such other common defensive tactics as lock-ups for assets
or stock, golden parachutes, options, and debt accelerations but only if triggered by
changes in stock ownership; and
c) any structure which interferes with the transferability of corporate control
through the market by denying to the registered securities the total and equal voting
power of the corporation.
This free transferability regime may and should be reinforced by two addi-
tional special rules:
a) an obligation that purchases or sales of shares by the corporation in the context
of a tender offer be made only through pro rata offers to all shareholders, thus reduc-
ing the opportunity for discrimination through greenmail and through placing diluted
stock in friendly hands; and
b) a minimum open period for management-approved mergers and similar funda-
mental-change transactions equal in length to the one applicable to tender offers, so
that friendly and hostile acquisitions are put on the same timetable in terms of al-
lowing for due deliberation as well for other choices to develop for the benefit of share-
holders and any other corporate constituencies.
The proposed approach focuses on management abuses but is not intended
to preclude also strengthening further the existing provisions that are aimed at
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the tender offerors, for example, by extending the minimum open period for
tender offers from twenty to thirty-five or sixty days, inviting competition and
giving shareholders more time to decide, or by reducing the ten-day reporting
window for substantial acquisitions of stock. Neither does it deny the authority
of management, despite its conflicting interests and manipulative powers, not
only to pursue competitive friendly mergers but even to enter directly the secur-
ities markets as a trader, alone or with its allies, and compete with the tender
offer on equal footing.
Fifth, protecting the transferability of securities in the interstate markets is
not tantamount to abandoning other constituencies affected by corporate take-
overs, such as labor or local communities, to their fate. The legitimate interests
of such groups could be protected through more narrow and efficient means
which do not impede the transfer of productive resources to more qualified users
and which operate neutrally, that is not only in hostile but also in friendly ac-
quisitions, which constitute the vast majority of corporate combinations. A good
example of such legislation is the recent federal "plant-closing-notice" statute.
By contrast, generic antitakeover tactics, such as the elimination of cumulative
voting, may end up harming labor interests.4
In conclusion, Congress should modernize and extend the federal takeover
law. The damage inflicted by one-sided state regulation goes beyond mere cor-
porate dysfunction through management entrenchment, reduction of share-
holder power, and inefficiency. Not only is the freedom of the interstate securi-
ties markets also seriously compromised but the very allocation of the
productive resources themselves throughout the nation is distorted by parochial-
ist state barriers. In practical terms, Congress has many options and choices. As
outlined in this Essay, a wise approach would: a) limit federal intervention to
protecting the transferability of interstate securities through objective means
and without interfering in corporate governance and management; b) treat
friendly and hostile acquisitions alike; and c) safeguard the interests of corpo-
rate constituencies other than the shareholders through more specific and better
aimed measures.
4. For example, absent cumulative voting, labor recently failed to elect a union representative on the Board
of Pacific Enterprises. Elimination of Cumulative Voting Forecloses Union Official's Effort to Gain Seat on the
Board, Corp. Couns. Wkly. (BNA) No. 10, at 6 (Mar. 7, 1990).
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